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Other courts, however, have allowed discovery of information
relating 43to insurance where it was relevant to the issues in

the case.

In Gold, plaintiff wanted this information in order to induce
settlement discussions. In support of this contention the plaintiff
cited several federal decisions 44 which required disclosure of
insurance amounts under the federal rules.45 The federal position
is based on the theory that if the policy limits are low, a party
would tend to accept a settlement more readily, thus reducing
the heavy automobile negligence dockets. However, the Gold
court claimed that the CPLR is more restrictive in its approach
to pretrial disclosure. Nevertheless, the court could have followed
the federal decisions by applying CPLR 104.46 By liberally
construing CPLR 3101, the spirit of a "just, speedy and inexpensive determination" would be promoted.
CPLR 3101(a), (d).:

Disclosure of iunnes and addresses
of witnesses.

While under the CPA a party was not generally required
to disclose the names and addresses of witnesses,47 the present
trend under the CPLR has been toward such disclosure. 4
CPLR 3101(a) allows disclosure where the identity of witnesses is "material and necessary." This provision would appear
to be limited by subdivision (d)'s proviso that where the names
are considered material prepared for litigation, they are conditionally immune from disclosure. 49 However, disclosure has been
allowed, both under the CPLR and the CPA, where the witness
was present at the time of the occurrence 5" or was an active
43Merchants Indem. Corp. v. Wallack, 14 App. Div. 2d 777, 219
N.Y.S.2d 1014 (2d Dep't 1961); Guilianelle v. Brownell, 7 App. Div. 2d
691, 179 N.Y.S.2d 344 (3d Dep't 1958).
44 Ash v. Farwell, 37 F.R.D. 553 (D. Kan. 1965); Hurley v. Schnid,
37 F.R.D. 1 (D. Ore. 1965); Hill v. Greer, 30 F.R.D. 64 (D. N.J. 1961).
45FED. R. Crv. P. §§ 26(b), 33.
461n Hill v. Greer, supra note 44, the federal court applied FED. R. Civ.
P. § 1 which is similar to CPLR 104 in order to justify disclosure of
insurance limits under the federal rules.
4 CPA § 288; Martyn v. Braun, 270 App. Div. 768, 59 N.Y.S.2d 588 (?d
Dep't 1946).
Rios v. Donovan, 21 App. Div. 2d 409, 250 N.Y.S.2d 818 (1st Dep't
1964); Matter of Pennino's Estate, 41 Misc. 2d 791, 246 N.Y.S2d 348
(Surr. Ct. Westchester County 1963).
49 Bit see 3 WEmSTm-N, KoRN & Mn.LER, Nmv YoRx CIVIL PRACrICE
1113101.11, 3101.48 (1966).
50 Votey v. New York City Transit Authority, 46 Misc. 2d 554, 260
N.Y.S.2d 124 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1965).
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participant, 1 or where the names were necessary for the party
to substantiate his claims. 2
In Rivera v. Stewart, 3 plaintiff, at the examination before
trial, sought the identity of witnesses to the accident known to
the defendant. The defendant refused to disclose the requested
information. The court required disclosure of the names and
addresses of the passengers in the defendant's car as well as those
witnesses who were found by the defendant through personal
observation at the scene of the accident. Such witnesses were
considered a part of the facts and circumstances of the accident.
However, the court did not allow disclosure of the names and
addresses of witnesses which were obtained by the defendant
through an investigation after the accident since such information
came within CPLR 3101 (d) as "material prepared for litigation,"
and the plaintiff had not shown himself to be within one of the
recognized exceptions.
CPLR 3101(a), (d).: Opinion questions of defendants permitted
at an examination before trial.
5 4
In People ex rel. Kraushaar Bros. & Co. v. Thorpe,
a tax
certiorari case, the Court of Appeals held that a third party
witness, a tax assessor, subpoenaed as an expert, was not required
to give his expert opinion at the trial, although he could be
questioned as to the facts he observed concerning the case.
In a similar case, McDernott v. Manhattan Eye, Ear &
Throat Hosp.,55 the defendant physicians objected to being called
as expert witnesses on plaintiff's behalf in a malpractice case.
However, the Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff was entitled
to call the defendants to the stand at the trial and question them
about both their factual knowledge of the case, and, if qualified,
their knowledge as experts concerning the standards of skill and
care ordinarily exercised by doctors in the community under
similar circumstances.
McDermott was distinguished from
Kraushaar on the basis that in the former the expert opinion
was elicited from a defendant, while in the latter it was elicited
from a third party expert witness.

51 Pistana v. Pangburn, 2 App. Div. 2d 643, 151 N.Y.S.2d 742 (3d Dep't
1956); Votey v. New York City Transit Authority, supra note 50.

r52Majchrzak v. Hagerty, 49 Misc. 2d 1027, 268 N.Y.S.2d 937 (Sup. Ct.
Erie County 1966); McMahon v. Hayes-73rd Corp., 197 Misc. 319, 98
N.Y.S.2d 84 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1950); Matter of Pennino's Estate,
supra note 48.
53 51 Misc. 2d 647, 273 N.Y.S.2d 644 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1966).
r4 296 N.Y. 223, 72 N.E.2d 165 (1947).
U 15 NY,24 20, 203 N.E.2d 469, 255 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1964).

